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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
Notions of ‘energy security’, although continuously renegotiated and defined, have 
arguable always been present in debates around energy policy in the UK and many 
other countries around the world (World Economic Forum, 2006). Although the 
specific energy security aspects and policies differ across countries, many of the 
same principles apply (e.g. ensuring uninterrupted energy access; Winzer, 2011). 
More recently notions of ‘energy security’ (ES) have become increasingly important 
within UK energy policy debates, driving proposals for major energy system change, 
alongside climate change (CC) and affordability (DECC, 2009). 
 
Energy security is a complex, multi-faceted concept with numerous definitions 
(Chester, 2010). Despite its importance, little attention has been paid to how the 
public thinks and feels about this aspect of sustainability and energy policy. Interest 
in public perceptions of ES is however increasing internationally, particularly 
because of their role in understanding public engagement with (low-carbon) energy 
generating technologies, as well as behaviours around demand reduction and 
management (Knox-Hayes et al., 2013; Sovacool et al., 2012; Hobman et al., 2013; 
Poortinga et al., 2012).  
We explore what ES means to the general public, and provide a way of measuring 
ES concerns quantitatively using data from two surveys.  We also engage critically 
with conceptual discussions around public perception of ES to provide further 
theoretical elaboration of the topic. To begin, we will briefly discuss the 
2 
 
conceptualisation of ES, which provides the context for the examination of public 
perceptions. 
1.2 CONCEPTUALISING ‘ENERGY SECURITY’ 
As Chester (2010) notes, while the term ‘energy security’ is used widely in a variety 
of sectors (government, industry, academia), there has been little discussion of the 
notions which underpin its meaning. As a result, ES is often discussed in various 
terms including references to causes for concern (threats to continuous supply, e.g. 
failing infrastructure, depletion of resources), consequences of these risks (price 
spikes, petrol shortages) and ways of enhancing energy independence (reducing 
demand, alternative resources). Nonetheless, Winzer (2011) notes that all of these 
conceptualisations encapsulate a basic idea of avoiding sudden changes in the 
availability of energy relative to demand, and refer to an ‘idealised’ resilient system 
with low risks of interruptions to energy supply.  
Chester (2010) has further elaborated on the polysemic nature of the ES concept, 
where ‘energy security’ may be delineated through multiple dimensions (e.g. 
temporal, geographical) taking on different specificities in different contexts. 
Although ES can be narrowly discussed in terms of market-centric definitions and 
‘measured’ with quantitative indicators, there are also broader definitions which 
include qualitative aspects that go beyond the basic (un)availability of energy 
supply, such as affordability and sustainability (IEA, 2012a). 
In UK energy policy, ES is often described in terms of the risks it poses to the 
country, where “concerns over energy security are caused by either physical supply 
disruptions or spikes in energy prices” (POST, 2012 p1). Concerns about those 
aspects of ES are heightened in the UK for a number of reasons: 
First, the UK faces the nearing closure of many aging power stations and hence 
concerns are raised over possible electricity shortages if timely investment into new 
generation and transmission infrastructures is not found. For example, around a 
fifth of UK electricity capacity available in 2011 will close by the end of the decade, 
while peak demand is projected to grow by around 7GW (DECC, 2012b).  
Second, dependency on fossil fuels and energy imports has increasingly been a 
concern because the demand for fossil fuels will rise globally, even though 
resources are becoming scarcer and are located in fewer parts of the world (DECC, 
2012a). UK import dependency has steadily risen in the last decade and is expected 
to continue to increase (DECC, 2012a). It is argued that this high import dependency 
leads to greater exposure to global energy price fluctuations. In addition, many of 
the remaining fossil fuel reserves in 2020 and beyond will be located in politically 
unstable parts of the world which leads to worries about market manipulations and 
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increased vulnerabilities through longer supply chains. Although, at the moment, 
the UK receives most of its imported gas through Norway and the Netherlands, and 
is therefore less exposed to possible supply disruptions in Eastern Europe, this risk 
will increase over time (DTI, 2007). Similarly, it is highly uncertain whether domestic 
production of unconventional gas will deliver a degree of energy independence in 
the future (IEA, 2012b). 
Third, large investment in domestic, diverse and low-carbon sources is seen as 
necessary to achieve CC targets and simultaneously reduce dependence on foreign 
energy imports. It has been estimated that if 15% of the UK’s electricity comes from 
renewable sources in 2020, this could lead to a 20-30% decrease in gas imports 
(DECC, 2009). However, the likely diversification of supply sources and increased 
use of wind energy lead to concerns about producing reliable supply. As an 
example, the UK electricity sector currently enjoys reliability close to excellent with 
“the average consumer in the UK spending less than an hour and a half without 
power a year” (DECC, 2009, p72). It is therefore desirable to maintain this stable 
balance between demand and supply as the system undergoes major 
transformation1.  
Finally, conceptualisations of ES differ depending on the perspective taken, ranging 
from the international through to regional, national, and local, and also differ 
across stakeholders such as industry, communities and individuals (Chester, 2010). 
From the perspective of the individual, it could be argued that diminished ‘energy 
security’ is primarily experienced through fuel shortages or power cuts, as well as 
through the price of energy, i.e. energy bills (Burgess & Nye, 2008). In addition, it 
has been suggested that most people think about ‘energy’ in terms of the services it 
provides, for example heating and feeling comfortable in our homes (e.g. Sovacool, 
2011). Traditionally these perspectives have been underrepresented in energy 
policy, where energy is typically conceptualised as a strategic resource or 
commodity (Stern & Aronson, 1984). Nonetheless the above mentioned ES risks, 
although quite abstract in nature, all have potentially significant impacts on both 
the price and availability of energy as experienced by the individual.  
ES issues are therefore becoming ever more important in the UK and 
internationally, with various occurrences highlighting different aspects of ES. The 
“Arabian Spring” has highlighted the issue of Western (especially European) 
dependence on this part of the world for much of its oil, while the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear emergency in Japan has refocused attention on the viability of the 
so-called ‘nuclear renaissance’ (Hindmarsh, 2013). In the UK the energy regulator 
Ofgem has reported an increased likelihood of power shortages by 2015, 
highlighting ES risks other than price spikes for the first time in such a public 
manner (BBC News, October 2012). These events make different aspects of energy 
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salient for periods at a time, which may or may not have lasting effects on people’s 
views. It therefore also becomes of importance to develop methodologies to 
understand public perspectives on ES, and to effectively incorporate these into 
decision-making in energy policy. 
 
1.3 PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ENERGY SECURITY 
Public perceptions of ES have not been studied extensively, especially when 
compared with other issues affecting energy policy, such as attitudes to CC or 
specific supply technologies (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2011; Pidgeon, 2012). A large part 
of existing research comes from opinion polls (mostly commissioned by interest 
groups). These polls have typically asked a multitude of questions quite 
unsystematically, and public views on ES are generally inferred from a wide variety 
of questions on energy policies, without further discussion in terms of their 
meaning (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2006; IpsosMori, 2010).  
Previous research has found that importance of energy issues is low when 
respondents are asked to choose between different social issues. In 2006, energy 
related issues were seen to be of secondary importance compared to concerns over 
unemployment, crime, the economy, and environmental protection in many 
European countries (Eurobarometer, 2006). In a UK poll, price and affordability was 
rated more important than environmental considerations in relation to gas and 
electricity (IpsosMori, 2010), and in a similar poll, respondents prioritised clean air 
and affordability before reliability and energy independence (Bisconti Research, 
2007). However in a more recent poll (Populus, 2011), respondents were asked to 
rank three key energy policy goals. Although cost was still ranked highest by most 
people, this was followed by “enough energy to keep the lights on” before 
environmental concerns. Findings from these types of questions are difficult to 
compare, however, and can vary substantially due to subtle aspects of question 
framing and hence the implicit trade-offs respondents are asked to make 
(Oppenheim, 1992). 
One aspect of ES that has been focused on quite extensively is that of dependence 
on fossil fuels and foreign supplies of energy. For example, 61% are extremely or 
very concerned over the UK’s dependence on energy produced in other countries 
(Ipsos Public Affairs, 2010). A slightly different question shows that 74% are 
concerned that Britain might run out of gas in the next 10-15 years (IpsosMori, 
2010). Hence concern for dependence on fossil fuels seems relatively high among 
members of the UK public. 
A more subtle picture emerges when respondents are asked about the likelihood of 
potential consequences (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2006). These questions are interesting 
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because they ask about risks more closely related to our personal use of energy. 
The 2006 Eurobarometer found that a large majority in the UK (86%) thinks it is 
very, or somewhat, likely that energy prices would be multiplied by two or more 
times in the next three years; a lower percentage (62%) believe it likely that there 
will be significant disruptions in gas supply, although only 16% think this very likely.  
Reiner (2006) reported a high degree of support for government subsidies of 
renewable energy technologies, but also significant support for attaining ‘energy 
independence’. International public opinion is in line with this UK research, where 
concern about ES as a ‘foreign policy’ issue was found to be high in countries across 
the world, with a significant degree of support for measures such as energy 
conservation and investment in renewables to tackle ES (World Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2009). 
Finally, some recent research has begun to examine how ES beliefs influence and 
determine other beliefs around energy policy, for example linking beliefs about ES 
to the acceptability of nuclear power (Corner et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012), 
renewable energy (Lockwood, 2011) and energy-saving measures (Poortinga et al., 
2012). However the specific impacts of ES concerns are likely to be dependent on 
the context in which ES is framed and how public views are subsequently elicited. 
1.4 AIMS OF THIS PAPER AND CONCEPTUAL INFLUENCES 
The current research begins to systematically explore UK public views on ES in more 
detail. We present an attempt to quantitatively measure ES concerns in two surveys 
using a multi-item scale covering different aspects of ES. We sought to measure ES 
concerns to explore public perceptions in more detail than previous polls; to 
explore patterns of views; to ascertain whether some aspects or framings of ES 
attract more concern than others; and to analyse ES concerns in relation to other 
beliefs around energy and sustainability by presenting a comparison to CC concern.  
Public risk perceptions around ES are likely to be less developed than for example 
CC perceptions, partly because of its complex nature and partly because its lower 
profile (e.g. in the media, Happer et al., 2012). To aid interpretation of the findings 
we therefore take direction from theory around preference construction (Slovic, 
1995; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Behavioural decision research has demonstrated 
the strong influence of context on measures of preferences and values. It is 
recognised that, especially under conditions of unfamiliarity, the range and order of 
items being evaluated, the method of elicitation, and many other contextual factors 
can affect responses.  
We therefore assume that people do not have well-defined preferences in advance 
and instead will draw on a combination of information presented at the task, as 
well as information readily available to them (e.g. recent experiences, cultural and 
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social understandings about the world) to construct a response (Payne et al., 1992). 
Although this means that responses are somewhat contingent on the context, 
expressed preferences also reveal something about immediate reactions, and the 
deeper values that inform that response.  
The notion that responses are not fully-formed but rather “constructed” is 
particularly important to consider in survey research, and interpreting any 
particular survey finding therefore has to involve a degree of caution (e.g. 
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Pidgeon et al., 2012). Accordingly, we complement the 
use of surveys with findings from more qualitative data, which further 
contextualises public risk perceptions around ES. 
As a result, this article presents an initial exploration of public perceptions in the UK 
context, and although this represents only one set of issues at a particular point in 
time, it provides a useful platform for highlighting emerging issues and lines of 
inquiry. It is also a useful starting point for continuing to investigate how public 
perceptions may shift over time as both the UK and international context changes. 
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2 PUBLIC VIEWS ON ENERGY SECURITY – FINDINGS FROM TWO SOCIAL 
SURVEYS 
 
2.1 METHODS 
We present findings from two separate surveys conducted in 2010; both surveys 
took between 15-30 minutes to complete and focused on beliefs around renewable 
energy, CC and ES. Here we present the findings from a 10-item ES scale used in 
both surveys.  
2.1.1 Measures 
The previous sections have outlined the complex polysemic nature of ES (Chester, 
2010), which may make it difficult to operationalise in quantitative social surveys to 
capture public views. Due to the exploratory nature of this research we sought to 
include a range of different ES aspects. Ten items were subsequently constructed 
following analysis of the existing literature and pilot surveys to test different 
question formats (Demski, 2011). They represent five broad aspects of ES, i.e., the 
reliability of the energy system to have sufficient reserves to meet demand, the 
affordability of energy (i.e. preventing price increases/fluctuations), dependency on 
energy imports, the vulnerability to interruptions of the energy supply system (e.g. 
through terrorist attacks etc.), and an (over) dependency on fossil fuels. These 
items range from more immediate concerns such as price increases to more 
abstract causes for concern (e.g. perceived vulnerability to running out of fossil 
fuels) to reflect the diverse nature of ES issues in the UK context. Item presentation 
was randomised in the online survey. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
level of concern for each item on a 4-point concern scale (not at all concerned, not 
very concerned, fairly concerned, very concerned) as well as a ‘don’t know’ 
response2.  
In both surveys CC concern was measured using the question: “How concerned are 
you, if at all, about climate change?” Respondents were asked to indicate their 
concern on the same 4-point scale as for the ES items to make comparison between 
the two measures possible. The Cardiff survey also included a direct trade-off 
question asking respondents to indicate preference for ES and CC as energy policy 
goals. A 5-point bipolar response scale was used, where the mid-point indicates 
equal importance of both ES and CC, and the end-points indicating preference for 
ES or CC as the only important or more important issue (Appendix B). This item was 
developed to assess the relative importance of the two issues. 
 
2.1.2 Procedure - The Cardiff survey  
A total of 1,963 questionnaires were delivered during May and June 2010 in five 
Cardiff areas3. The five sampling areas were chosen using approximate social grade4 
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as measured in the 2001 UK census to achieve a sample with a diverse socio-
economic background. The chosen areas also represent slight oversampling of 
lower social-economic status areas because it was expected that these would show 
lower response rates (Dillman, 2007). A postal procedure was used where 
questionnaires were dropped through the letterbox and either collected or mailed 
back. The procedure for data collection consisted of three major phases (pre-
notification, distribution, reminder) and follows that recommended by Dillman 
(2007) to maximise response rates. All materials are available on request (also see 
Demski, 2011).  
Overall, 26.5% of people returned their questionnaires resulting in 520 usable 
responses. This response rate compares with other similar unsolicited UK postal 
surveys (Whitmarsh, 2011). It was evident that respondents in areas with higher 
socio-economic status were more likely to return the questionnaire, in turn 
resulting in a somewhat more highly educated sample than found in the national 
population, particularly with regards to postgraduate-level education. Younger 
people between the ages 16 and 34 were also under sampled (see Appendix A). 
2.1.3 Procedure - The online survey  
In order to test the measures on a more diverse sample, a second survey was 
carried out later in the year (November 2010). Although the specific focus was on 
attitudes to wind energy it still included questions on CC and ES. This also allows 
analysis of the ES items in a more representative sample. This survey was 
distributed to a UK online panel of respondents by the recruitment company 
Maximiles, which provides its members with rewards in exchange for redeemable 
loyalty points. The company have a monitored panel of 950,000 UK opt-in members 
representative of the UK population.  
Online software was used to construct and host the questionnaire (Qualtrics Labs, 
2010). Age and gender quotas based on the 2001 census (UK population) were used 
for sampling to ensure a balanced sample. The survey was distributed to all regions 
in the UK, and to potential respondents with diverse educational backgrounds.  
Overall, 510 completes were recorded when the quotas had been filled. Eleven 
participants were deleted for quality purposes (survey response time below 3:30 
minutes or no response variability on all questions) leaving 499 usable responses. 
Response rates were not recorded and are considered non-indicative when using 
online quota-sampling because non-response cannot be easily defined. 
Demographic information was consulted instead (Dillman, 2007). The sample is 
broadly representative of the UK population in terms of age and gender, although 
the level of education was somewhat higher than the national average; especially in 
terms of degree-level education (see Appendix A). The sample was weighted to the 
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known UK population on the basis of age, gender, education and working status 
(using aggregated weights based on 2001 census data and mid-year population 
estimates; ONS, 2007); however descriptive statistics were not found to be 
significantly different between weighted and unweighted samples (generally 
responses different by no more than 1%). As such, unweighted statistics are 
reported. 
2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1 Concerns about different aspects of energy security 
Examining the individual items across the two surveys, differences emerge but the 
pattern of responses is very similar (Table 1, Figure 1). At first, it looks as if 
respondents in the Cardiff survey were more concerned than the online survey. For 
example 83% of respondents in the online survey were very or fairly concerned 
about dependence on other countries, compared to 88% in the Cardiff survey (z = 
2.27, p<0.05). However, upon closer analysis, the mean concern for each item is 
very similar across both surveys (Table 1) with the main difference the number of 
people who chose the “don’t know” (DK) option. In the online sample, between 2-
5% more respondents indicated not knowing as compared to the Cardiff survey. 
These differences might have occurred due to methodological differences in the 
surveys, particularly because completing questionnaires online can increase DK 
responses (Heerwegh & Loosveldt, 2008). Similarly, people with higher educational 
attainment (overrepresented in the Cardiff survey) are less likely to indicate ‘don’t 
know’ than respondents with lower levels of formal education (Dillman, 2007). 
 DK responses are highest for the item on terrorist attacks (9%) and another country 
cutting off the UK’s energy supply (9%). The fact that a relatively high percentage of 
respondents opted for the DK response indicates that perhaps people find it 
difficult to judge these types of risks and are reluctant to provide answers.  
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Table 1 
Mean concern (and standard deviations, SD) for the individual energy security items 
in the Cardiff (May/June 2010) and online surveys (November 2010).  
How concerned are you, if at all, that 
in the future... 
 Mean (SD) 
Cardiff survey 
Mean (SD) 
Online survey 
…the UK will become too dependent on 
energy imports from other countries? 
 
 3.34 (.68) 3.32 (.72) 
…more and more of the UK’s energy 
supply is imported from far away? 
 
 3.50 (.62) 3.24 (.70) 
…fuel prices (petrol, electricity and gas) 
will be very high? 
 
 3.66 (.55) 3.51 (.66) 
…electricity may become unaffordable 
for you? 
 
 3.00 (.84) 3.08 (.80) 
…traditional energy sources (such as 
gas and oil) will run out? 
 
 3.35 (.70) 3.25 (.69) 
…the UK will not have alternatives in 
place (e.g. renewables) when fossil 
fuels (gas, oil) are no longer available? 
 
 3.33 (.68) 3.23 (.71) 
…terrorist attacks will cause 
interruptions to electricity supplies? 
 
 2.79 (.89) 2.70 (.85) 
…another country will cut off the UK’s 
energy supply? 
 
 2.95 (.87) 2.94 (.85) 
…there will be power cuts? 
 
 3.04 (.74) 2.96 (.72) 
…gas and electricity will be rationed? 
 
 2.95 (.86) 2.92 (.79) 
 
The pattern of concern is very similar across both surveys despite differences in the 
demographic profile of the samples. Respondents were most concerned about fuel 
prices being high and least concerned about terrorist attacks on energy 
infrastructure. The highest concerns in both cases also included items relating to 
importing fuel from far away and being dependent on other countries, as well as 
11 
 
risks of running out of traditional energy sources. Similarly, risks associated with 
another country cutting off supply, or rationing energy, were relatively lower in 
concern. These findings are also closely in line with a similar scale5 used in a fully 
nationally-representative survey in 2010 (Spence et al., 2010b).  
Subtle differences between items emerge when examining responses more closely. 
For example in the online survey, a large majority (57%) was very concerned over 
fuel prices being high and that the UK will become too dependent on energy 
imports (43%) whereas a much smaller percentage was very concerned over power 
cuts (20%), terrorist attacks (16%) and the possibility of rationing of electricity 
(23%). This suggests that these latter types of events are perhaps less expected, or 
attract more uncertainty and less urgency compared to others. This might be 
because they are less abstract in nature (e.g. compared to national dependence on 
imports) and in some cases ask respondents to consider concrete events (e.g. 
power cuts). The high concern over energy prices is perhaps unsurprising and aligns 
with sharply growing energy expenditure by UK households in the last decade 
(DECC, 2013).
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Fig. 1. Concern for each of the 10 energy security items in the Cardiff and online surveys (percentage of respondents). 
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13 
 
2.2.2 Concerns about Energy Security and Climate Change 
 
Concern for the ten ES items was averaged for each respondent; both surveys 
showed fairly high concern overall (mean = 3.19 and 3.12)6. Prior to this, the ES 
scales were found to be reliable in both surveys; Cronbach’s α = 0.87 (Cardiff 
survey) and 0.90 (online survey). 
We now compare results of the ES scale to concerns over CC to provide further 
insights into public perspectives around ES risks. This comparison is also 
appropriate because both are important framings of energy policy, often being 
evoked to provide support for various decisions about supply and demand side 
changes to the energy system. Although in theory CC targets and ES goals have 
been converging in UK energy policy, conflicts could occur where one is given 
priority over the other (UKERC, 2009). 
In both surveys the ES and CC questions were counterbalanced to check for any 
possible order effects. In fact, the order of questions did not affect the level of CC 
concern expressed in either survey (Cardiff survey F(1,518)=0.555, n.s.; Online 
survey F(1,493)=0.007, n.s.), but it did affect the level of ES concern (Table 2). 
Concern for ES issues was higher when respondents first answered the ES section 
compared to those that completed the CC section first. This effect was found in 
both the Cardiff survey (F(1,505=14.718, p<0.001) and the online survey 
(F(1,459)=5.749, p<0.05). 
 
Table 2 
Means (and standard deviations) for energy security and climate change 
concern as a function of which section was completed first in the Cardiff and 
online surveys. 
 Section completed first 
Energy security  Climate change  
Cardiff 
survey 
Energy security concern 3.28 (0.48) 3.11 (0.51) 
Climate change concern 3.06 (0.76) 3.01 (0.79) 
Online 
survey 
Energy security concern 3.17 (0.51) 3.05 (0.55) 
Climate change concern 2.72 (0.78) 2.73 (0.80) 
 
 It may be the case that the way people in the UK feel about CC is much more 
stable, and having indicated (quite substantial) concern for CC, this may then 
dampen (in comparison) the concern for other issues, i.e. ES, a much less known 
and discussed issue. Hence when first expressing concern for CC, this may then act 
as a direct contrast or anchor for subsequent responses. This represents a very 
subtle framing effect that must be kept in mind when conducting surveys of this 
14 
 
kind where multiple issues are asked about. Undeniable, however, is the fact that 
ES concern is still very high in both groups.  
Exploring these relationships further, the Cardiff survey included a question in 
which respondents were asked to indicate which energy policy goal they found 
more important when directly compared (Figure 2). Unsurprisingly, the most 
frequent response was that both ES and CC are equally important when considering 
Britain‘s energy future (55.2%). However, further analysis reveals that more 
respondents were leaning towards ES (25.2%) than CC (18.1%), confirmed by a one 
sample t-test, (t(516)= -3.340, p=0.001; M=2.88, SD=.757). Of course this means 
that overall a large majority find both goals equally important. However, upon 
analysing differences between these three preference groups, only CC concern 
seems to distinguish between the groups, not ES concern (Figure 3). In fact, ES 
concern was equally high for all three groups (F(2,501)=0.645,n.s.), whereas CC 
concern was significantly different for all three (F(2,514)=83.129, p<0.001), being 
the highest in the CC preference group and the lowest in the ES preference group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Results (percentage of respondents) of the climate change vs. energy 
security trade-off question in the Cardiff survey.  
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Fig. 3. Mean energy security and climate change concern as a function of 
prioritising energy security or climate change goals (standard deviations indicated 
in brackets). 
 
Together these findings suggest key differences between CC and ES concerns 
among the general UK public. Whereas CC concern seems more stable, ES concern 
seems more susceptible to framing effects. Previous research has found that CC 
concern is linked to environmental values and more fundamental ideologies 
(Spence et al., 2010a; Pidgeon, 2012). In contrast, the findings here suggest that ES 
concern may be more of a constructed, less solid belief, dependent on the context 
and only an emerging concern among the general public. Yet Figure 3 also suggests 
that ES does not vary much within the sample, always relatively high, whereas CC 
concern shows higher variability, a finding that is in line with increased attention 
being paid to ‘sceptical’ CC beliefs (Poortinga et al., 2011). Nonetheless the ES scale 
itself was reliable and successful in showing that ES issues are something that the 
public is concerned about when explicitly confronted with these issues; with 
consistent findings across both surveys. 
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3 UNFAMILIARITY AND UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ENERGY SECURITY CONCERNS 
Having shown that the general public expressed relatively high concern over ES 
issues we now offer some further context in which these results should be 
interpreted. We will use findings from interviews with members of the public 
conducted prior to the survey research7 to supplement this discussion (see Demski, 
2011).  
3.1.  METHODS 
The interviews (N=20), which contained a range of ages, genders and occupational 
background, were conducted separately to the surveys, although they were 
connected by being part of a wider project with similar aims (to explore public 
perception of renewable energy and other energy supply technologies). As such, 
the interviews did not focus solely on ES but on perceptions of energy sources and 
futures. Although a section at the end of the interview was earmarked for 
discussion of ES, this turned out to be challenging because the term itself was 
unknown to interviewees. We therefore present a thematic analysis of discussions 
of aspects of ES that were expressed spontaneously throughout the interview. This 
analysis was deemed exploratory and allowed us to better understand how, and if, 
people understood ES in relation to energy supply and futures (Demski, 2011).  
3.2  FINDINGDS 
The most important finding is that the term “energy security” was unfamiliar to our 
participants, which has been replicated in other studies (Happer et al., 2012; 
Parkhill et al., 2013). Participants did not use the term, or variations of it, to refer to 
identified concerns such as running out of oil. If asked, many stated that they had 
never heard of it: 
 
Interviewer: “...have you heard of the term energy security before?” 
Participant: “Energy security? No I don’t think so...” 
Interviewer: “What do you think it might mean?” 
Participant: “I have no idea...energy security...” (Male, age 30) 
 
Although there may be little awareness of the term itself, this did not mean people 
had no understanding of some of the underlying issues. Indeed, some aspects of ES 
were quite firmly embedded in discussions around, and even definitions of, various 
energy sources. Virtually all interviewees discussed the future of UK energy (supply) 
in terms of fossil fuels running out: this was seen as certain and inevitable and 
therefore renewable forms of energy supply were seen as vital in the long-term:  
 
“There‘s limited time until fossil fuels run out. So we need, in Britain, to 
increase our renewable energy sources, so that we can survive in the 
future.” (Female, age 26)  
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“So within our lifetimes it might not actually be possible to extract 
anymore of these resources. So clearly it is absolutely imperative that we 
develop sustainable, renewable sources of energy” (Female, age 67) 
This discourse, or some form of this, was the basic rationale underlying all 
discussions around the future supply of energy and shows an interpretation of ES 
aspects in relation to energy supply. However there were differences and more 
uncertainty in terms of the urgency to act which are important qualifiers with 
regards to “concern” over these issues. For example, one participant thought (in 
relation to fossil fuels running out that) “he’d be long dead before that happens” 
(Male, age 46) whereas the second quote above displays a lot more urgency with 
respect to fossil fuels needing replacement. 
Examining the spontaneous discussion of ES issues, most of the discourse focused 
around “dependence” and future supply. Dependence was discussed in terms of UK 
vulnerability due to dependence on fossil fuels and dependence on other 
countries/imports. Spontaneous discussion of these aspects was quite prominent 
and was accompanied by substantial concern, which is in line with the findings from 
the surveys where highest concern was expressed for these aspects relative to 
others. 
Other aspects of ES were less often discussed in terms of threats to future supply. 
For example, the reliability of wind and solar energy was discussed when these 
supply sources were considered, but that did not prevent them from being 
proposed as solutions to other ES concerns such as reducing dependence, ensuring 
future supply and diversifying our energy. The conception of domestic, diverse, 
endless and clean energy was more powerful than any notions around 
(un)reliability. It is perhaps unsurprising that when ES is framed in this way, this 
provides a strong positive framing for the development of renewable sources as 
found in some recent research (Lockwood, 2011). 
It is also interesting to note that these risks (e.g. of dependence) were mostly 
discussed in the abstract, rather than how they might concretely manifest 
themselves, or affect the UK specifically or one personally. The perceived 
international and abstract nature of these risks may also remove the individual 
from the more personal implications of ES, and hence suggests a psychological 
distancing effect similar to that found for CC beliefs (Spence et al., 2012). This is in 
line with the quantitative findings from the surveys, where more abstract ES issues 
like dependence on imports received higher concern than more concrete events 
such as terrorist attacks or ‘consequences’ of risks such as rationing of energy. 
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As mentioned previously, the main way people might feel the effects of energy 
insecurity is through energy bills, fuel shortages and blackouts which disrupt the 
services provided by energy. In particular, high energy costs (e.g. because of our 
dependence on fossil fuels) were discussed frequently. This is not surprising 
considering that this is the primary manner in which many people currently interact 
with energy, in addition to price increases frequently making the headlines in the 
UK (BBC News, December 2012). In addition, both surveys found high levels of 
concern over energy prices. On the other hand, the risks of fuel shortages and 
power cuts were acknowledged in the interviews at times but, unlike prices, not 
necessarily seen as inevitable, particularly disruptions of any significance (e.g. a 
power cut lasting longer than a few minutes). However the consequences of a 
national blackout were at times acknowledged and evoked experiences from 
previous fuel shortages, such as “queues at petrol stations, 30 or 40 cars”.  
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4 DISCUSSION 
In summary, the findings presented in this paper suggest that ES risks are of 
concern to the UK public, but with attitudes being potentially more unstable when 
compared to those of CC. The interviews in turn suggest that the term “energy 
security” is unfamiliar to people. Notions around ES may be loosely based on 
dependence and external threats to supply, aspects of ES that received the highest 
concern in both surveys, and that arose spontaneously in the interviews.  
Previously we introduced the idea of preference construction as a way of thinking 
about the current status of ES attitudes, in part, due to the unfamiliarity and low 
salience of ES issues, and in part, due to its complex nature (Chester, 2011). Both of 
these characteristics make it more likely that people do not have stable or fully-
formed views about ES. Instead people may arrive at a response by drawing on a 
range of their existing beliefs and values, their instant affective reactions, and 
inferred context (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). In this regard examining public 
perceptions of ES has similarities with the examination of public perceptions of 
emerging technologies or other complex social issues – e.g. nanotechnologies (e.g. 
Pidgeon et al., 2011). Indeed, several findings point to the notion that ES is quite 
intangible in nature, and public representations and understandings have yet to be 
fully established. There were generally high DK responses in the surveys indicating 
that some members of the public may have found it difficult to make a judgement. 
Similarly, concern over ES was subject to a framing effect, where the level of 
expressed ES concern varied depending on whether it was preceded by a question 
on CC concern or not. In addition, the interview findings suggest that there was a 
considerable amount of uncertainty among members of the public, for example 
when considering personal implications of ES risks. 
Although preference construction theory would suggest variability in people’s 
responses, there are aspects of the results that point to more stable characteristics 
of public perceptions. First, we generally observed consistently high concern across 
all ES items in both surveys. Second, more abstract notions around dependence on 
other countries and running out of fossil fuels generally received higher concern 
than more concrete events like blackouts or terrorist attacks on infrastructure.   
Although we did not examine why people displayed high concern for ES issues, the 
nature of the findings led us to think through other factors, primarily drawn from 
risk perception literature that might be relevant in understanding public responses. 
We envisage this following discussion to provide a basis for future examinations of 
public views on ES and related beliefs. 
On one hand, the findings that concern for ES issues was consistently and generally 
high among members of the UK public invites questions as to what underlies this 
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concern. On the other hand, the relatively high number of DK responses in the 
survey and the unfamiliarity expressed in the interviews also raise questions for 
further research. One line of inquiry that might shed further light on both of these 
findings is to consider risk perceptions in relation to the probability or likelihood of 
something occurring versus the severity of consequences. Indeed, previous 
research suggests that people often base a large part of their evaluations of a risk 
on the latter (severity of consequences) more than the former (probability; e.g. 
Breakwell, 2007; Parkhill et al., 2013). As such, the high concern for ES issues found 
in the surveys may be linked to perceptions of threat to something that is 
particularly essential in our society. For example, if there were to be problems 
leading to significant supply disruptions, the consequences for the nation and 
individuals could be quite severe, e.g. petrol shortages might mean you are unable 
to get to work, or supermarkets run low on food supplies etc. The role of affect and 
emotions associated with the perceived consequences of various ES risks would be 
an important further examination (Slovic et al., 2004).  
In addition, ES risks are qualitatively high on characteristics which have been shown 
to increase public risk perceptions, for example risks are perceived to be higher 
(and more unacceptable) if they are imposed on us, if they are relatively 
uncontrollable (e.g. dependence on imports, lack of alternatives), and if they have 
the potential for catastrophic outcomes (e.g. prolonged electricity shortage leading 
to societal breakdown; Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 2000). Examining these specific 
risk perceptions would provide a more in-depth understanding of why publics 
express relatively high concern for ES risks. 
In contrast, uncertainty in the interviews and high DK responses, especially for 
more concrete items like terrorist attacks compared to more abstracts notions 
around scarcity of fossil fuels, might be related to judgements about likelihood 
rather than severity. Although we did not ask people for their judgements about 
‘likelihood’, it might be understandable why people find it difficult the judge these 
risks and their probability of occurrence considering the complex nature of the 
energy system and its many national and international dimensions. Judging 
probabilities of specific ES risks is difficult and problematic, especially in an energy 
system that has suffered little disruption in recent years. A lack of experiences may 
mean that disruptions in energy service are not readily available in memory to draw 
upon (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This discussion however must be supplemented 
by the acknowledgement that even experts find it notoriously difficult to assess and 
agree on the degree of the various risks to the system (Chester, 2010). It is also 
possible that uncertainty may manifest specifically in judgements about personal 
consequences of ES risks, for example judgements as to whether conflicts in 
another country will have direct impacts on the supply at home, e.g. through price 
spikes or actual disruptions. 
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As mentioned previously, the current study finds a difference between public 
perceptions of more abstract or national risks compared to perceptions of more 
concrete or personal risks. Here we find a tendency that the latter receive perhaps 
slightly less concern compared to the former (with the exception of energy prices). 
However the current research does not fully pull these two apart; further work 
closely looking at personal, more concrete notions of ES risks would be particularly 
useful, including an examination of how perceptions differ across individuals with, 
for example, different socio-demographic backgrounds (Sovacool et al., 2012). 
One type of personal risk associated with ES that was included in the surveys 
involved energy affordability; here we find that people are highly concerned about 
being able to afford energy in the future. Emerging research around public 
perception of energy costs also shows that these are further bound up with other 
beliefs around fairness, equity and responsibility, and in that regard might 
represent one way in which public and ‘official’ notions of ES diverge (Parkhill et al., 
2013). The nature of public perceptions of energy costs and their implications are 
starting to be explored (Butler et al., 2013), but represent a key area for further 
research. 
Similarly, understanding in more detail how ES risks are perceived by the public 
might also be informed by further inquiry into what energy means to people in their 
everyday lives and associated beliefs around dependence and control. As such, 
events that threaten the continuity of energy services, even if hypothetical, may 
temporarily make the taken for granted ‘visible’ (e.g. Hargreaves et al., 2010). If this 
is coupled with a sense of high dependence on energy and a lack of control (e.g. 
‘there are no alternatives to driving my car’), this may result in high risk 
perceptions. This line of thought has been suggested when investigating the view 
that energy is seen as a social good (Stern & Aronson, 1984), evoking imported 
questions about who is seen to be responsible for ensuring a continuous access to 
energy services (Parkhill et al., 2013). For example, do publics ascribe responsibility 
to government and industry actors or is there a sense of personal responsibility, 
and in what areas of ES? Do publics see a role for personal action in maintaining ES? 
The answers to these questions will also have important implications for risk 
communication and public engagement around ES. For example, if we find that high 
concern is coupled with little perceived personal responsibility and a perceived lack 
of control, risk communication strategies could focus on linking national and 
personal aspects of ES risks, and engaging people with how they personally can 
contribute to their own ES (e.g. by reducing their overall energy use). In addition, 
reassurances by government may be useful in areas where publics have little 
control, for example, communication about emergency procedures for more 
national-level concerns.  
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In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that ES is perhaps only an emerging 
concept within public discourse. Although concern over ES issues is likely to remain 
high, specific perceptions are also likely to vary and emerge as the ES landscape 
shifts and changes. Domestic and international developments will impact upon 
these perceptions at any given point in time; examples might include the increasing 
rhetoric around shale gas and its role in energy dependence and pricing both in the 
UK and elsewhere. It is thus important to both track the emergence and 
development of public ES risk perceptions and discourses, and to explore what 
drives these risk perceptions in more detail. 
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1
 Although this is a particular focus on the electricity sector, transport and heating are also 
vulnerable because they are almost entirely dependent on gas and oil in the UK currently. 
 
2
 The pilot surveys prior to this stage indicated that respondents were reluctant to answer 
‘likelihood’ questions in questionnaires (e.g. “How likely do you think it is that the UK will have 
frequent power cuts in 10 years?”) hence a concern scale was used instead. 
 
3
 The first survey was carried out in Cardiff in part because of limited resources. Nonetheless 
choosing a UK capital city allowed access to a diverse sample in terms of socio-economic 
background. 
 
4
 Social grade is a variable computed based on the occupation of the Main Earner (which is the 
previous occupation for those retired or unemployed and current occupation for others). The Main 
Earner occupation variable is populated according to ISCO (International Standard Classification of 
Occupations, available at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/>). 
 
5
 The national survey conducted in 2010 (reported in Spence et al., 2010b) used similar items to 
measure public perceptions of ES. Both sets of items were created from the same piloting (Demski, 
2011). In the case of the 2010 survey, only 6 items were used and these were embedded in a survey 
examining public perceptions of climate change and nuclear power. 
 
6
 Instead of listwise deleting all respondents with a DK response in any of the ten items, we adopted 
a procedure whereby we calculated mean ES concern for all respondents who had 3 or less DK 
responses to retain numbers and allow inclusion of their views. 
In the online survey, 15% of respondents had 3 or less DK responses. These were more likely to be 
women. 6% of the sample had more than 3 DK responses, but these did not belong to any particular 
demographic group. 
In the Cardiff survey, 11% of respondents had 3 or less DK responses. These were more likely to be 
aged over 65. Only 2% of the sample had more than 3 DK responses. 
The mean concern in both surveys did not differ depending on whether all DK responses were 
excluded or the ‘3 or less’ rule was used. For the Cardiff survey, t(955), 0.125, p=0.901 where 
M=3.19, SD=.50 if DK responses are included and M=3.19, SD=0.51 if they are listwise deleted. For 
the online survey, t(853)=-0.137, p=0.853 where M=3.12, SD=0.53 if DK responses are included and 
M=3.12, SD=0.55 if they are listwise deleted. 
7
 Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in May-August 2009 with diverse members of 
the public in Cardiff, recruited from the Community Panel of the Cardiff University Psychology 
department. This panel is maintained by the department by advertising for paid or voluntary 
participation in psychology studies. A diverse range of participants were contacted on the basis of 
age, gender, education and occupation. On average, the sample is well educated (over half say they 
have a postgraduate degree) with the youngest interviewee being 21 and the oldest being 67 years 
old. 12 women and 8 men were interviewed. The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. See 
Demski (2011) for full methodological details.  
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Appendix A. Sample characteristics of the Cardiff and online surveys in 
comparison to national data (based on 2001 UK census data and 2007 mid-year 
population estimates; ONS, 2007a). 
 Cardiff survey  
(N= 520) 
Online survey 
(N= 499) 
UK National 
Gender 
Male 49% 48% 48% 
Female 49% 52% 52% 
Declined 2% -  
Age 
16-24 2% (18-) 12% (15-17) 3 
(18-24) 12% 
25-34 11% 16% 14% 
35-44 21% 19% 18% 
45-54 22% 17% 17% 
55-64 23% 16% 14% 
65-74 12% 12% 13% 
75-84 6% 7% 9% 
85+ 1% 
Declined 2% - - 
Level of education 
No formal qualifications 14% 13% 18% 
GCSE/O-level 15% 18% 19% 
Vocational/NVQ 11% 7% 11% 
A-Level /Higher/BTEC 9% 20% 18% 
Degree or equivalent 19% 31% 19% 
Postgraduate  28% 5% 6% 
Other 2% 2% 8% 
Still studying Below 1% 4% Below 1% 
Declined 3% Below 1% - 
Working status 
Working (full-time) 45% 40% 36% 
Working (part-time) 12% 12% 13% 
Unemployed – seeking  work 2% 4%  
8% Unemployed-not seeking work 1% 2% 
Retired 27% 24% 27% 
Looking after house/children 5% 7% 7% 
Disabled 2% 5% 3% 
Student 2% 5% 7% 
Other 1% 1% Below 1% 
Declined 2% Below 1% - 
a
 ONS, 2007. Office for National Statistics. Mid-year population estimates. Available from 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/all-releases.html?definition=tcm%3A77-22371> 
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Appendix B. Full text of the energy security vs. climate change trade-off 
question in the Cardiff survey. 
 
When considering what energy technologies Britain should use in the future, which 
of these two issues do you think is more important? 
Energy security – making sure the UK has a continuous, secure and affordable 
supply of energy 
Climate change – reducing the use of carbon emitting enegry sources like fossil 
fuels (coal, oil, gas) 
 
 
Energy 
security as 
the only 
important 
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Both – but 
energy secrity 
is more 
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than climate 
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Both – but 
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